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1. Introduction 
Equity  markets  have  historically  enjoyed  periods  of  spectacular  growth  in  prices  followed  by  rapid 
reversals. Such phenomenal price movements have caused the development of asset-pricing models that 
try to explain the evolution of prices as well as to produce profitable forecasts for investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, many of these models often fail to predict the movement of prices in financial markets 
accurately, especially in times of high volatility in asset returns. This failure is sometimes attributed to an 
inability  of  these  models  to  capture  ‘fundamental’  values  accurately.  Other  researchers  claim  that,  in 
certain periods, fundamental values seem to be irrelevant in the pricing of financial assets. The behavior of 
stock  market  prices  prior  to  the  1929  and  1987  stock  market  crashes  are  the  most  frequently  cited 
examples of such periods of fundamental value irrelevance (see for example Galbraith (1954), Wanniski 
(1978), Camerer (1989), White (1990), De Long and Shleifer (1991), Rappoport and White (1994), Shiller 
(2000)). The evolution of stock market prices in these two periods has inspired the search for other 
factors, beyond fundamentals, that might affect market prices and thus cause their ‘apparent’ deviations 
from fundamental values. One possible explanation for these deviations is the presence of speculative 
bubbles.  
 
Rational  speculative  bubbles  have  intrigued  financial  theorists  because  they  provide  an  alternative 
explanation for the evolution of prices that does not require the assumption of investor irrationality. Since 
Shiller’s (1981) seminal paper, several indirect and direct methodologies have been developed to test for 
the presence of bubbles in equity, currency and commodities markets and in monetary data. Indirect tests 
are based on the identification of bubbles through an examination of the distributional properties of actual 
prices (or returns) and fundamental values (see for example Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981), 
Blanchard and Watson (1982), Mankiw et al. (1985)), through tests for cointegrating relationships between 
actual prices and fundamental values (see Hamilton and Whiteman (1985), Hamilton (1986), Meese (1986), 
Campbell and Shiller (1987), Diba and Grossman (1988a), Hall et al. (1999)1), or through an examination 
of the specifications of the present value relationship and the actual relationship between prices and 
dividends (see Meese (1986), West (1987), Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt (1990)).  
 
Since indirect tests are usually a joint test of bubble absence and of the validity of the present value model 
(see Kleidon (1986a,b), West (1988), Joerding (1988)), they are usually argued to provide only ‘hints’ of 
bubble  presence  and  not  proof.  Direct  tests  by  contrast  examine  the  presence  of  specific  forms  of 
speculative bubbles by identifying the presence of bubble-like behavior in financial and macroeconomic 
data. Direct tests have focused on the presence of deterministic bubbles (Flood and Garber (1980), Flood 
et al. (1984), Salge (1997)), fads (Summers (1986), Fama and French (1988), Cutler et al. (1991)) and on the 
                                                       
1 Hall et al. (1999) formulate a test that is able to identify periodically collapsing speculative bubbles and as such, it can be 
classified as a direct bubble test. Nevertheless, because it is based on the identification of periods of explosive behavior in 
macroeconomic  data  through  a  switching  augmented  Dickey  Fuller  test,  we  have  classified  it  as  an  indirect  test  of  bubble 
presence. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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presence of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles (McQueen and Thorley (1994), van Norden (1996), 
van Norden and Schaller (1999), Bohl (2000), Sornette and Johansen (1997)). 
 
In an important recent paper, van Norden and Schaller (1999)2 (vNS hereafter) propose a switching 
regime  speculative  behavior  model  for  testing  for  the  presence  of  periodically  partially  collapsing 
speculative  bubbles.  vNS  construct  a  switching  regime  model  of  returns  with  a  state  independent 
probability  of  switching  regimes.  In  their  model,  the  probability  of  switching  regimes  is  a  negative 
function of the absolute size of the bubble. Although direct tests find mixed evidence of speculative 
bubbles, all of these tests, with the exception of Sornette and Johansen (1997), assume that bubble crashes 
are exogenous events. However, it is usually thought that bubble collapses are a result of a change in 
investors’ beliefs concerning the future of the bubble. Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) augment the model of 
vNS  for  testing  for  the  presence  of  periodically  partially  collapsing  speculative  bubbles  by  including 
observed abnormal volume as a predictor of the time of the crash. They argue that abnormal volume is a 
predictor and a classifier of returns because it can provide information to investors about the belief of the 
market in the future of the bubble. Since all investors have access to information about past trading 
volume, upon the observation of increased volume in the market, they perceive that other investors are 
liquidating the bubbly asset and thus, they may rush to liquidate their holdings. This will cause a bubble 
collapse. Collapses, in this case, are caused endogenously since more investor selling leads to an increased 
supply of the asset.  
 
A possible explanation for the initial drop followed by the significant increase in equity prices during the 
last 25 years of the twentieth century is offered by Zeira (1999). In his study, Zeira presents a model of 
stock market booms and crashes caused by the uncertainty investors face about fundamental values. In 
effect, market booms are caused by informational overshooting when new technologies are implemented 
in the production process and the limit of such technologies is unknown. Once the limit of this ‘new’ 
technology is reached, market participants realize that no further growth is possible and thus cause market 
prices to crash. This model can be transformed to explain market booms and crashes using the arrival of 
new investors to the market (‘greater fools’) or the liberalization of monetary policy by central banks. 
Zeira claims that this model is capable of partly explaining the booms and crashes of 1929, 1987 and the 
boom of the Information Technology Era, but for his model to be able to explain historical ‘bubble-like’ 
episodes would require that the arrival and ‘death’ of new technologies is synchronized and that investors 
                                                       
2 vNS’s approach is based on previous work by van Norden and Schaller (1993) who examined whether apparent deviations from 
dividend based fundamentals are able to predict stock market crashes and rallies. In their original paper, they used data on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index and found that the speculative behavior model has significant explanatory power for 
excess stock market returns, since the ex ante conditional probability of a bubble collapse increases prior to many actual stock 
market crashes and rallies. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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are myopic and do not adapt their expectations to information about the limits of the technology, revealed 
before the limit is reached3.  
 
Another model that can help explain the variation of the S&P 500 during the 1990’s is presented by 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000). In their studies, they present a model 
of technological change that can replicate booms and crashes observed in financial data and can explain 
stock  market  valuations  during  the  last  25  years.  The  main  suggestion  of  the  model  is  that  new 
technologies destroy old, incumbent firms4 once the success of the new technology is made known to the 
market. Since new technologies are rarely formed by listed companies, and because listed companies 
usually  resist  their  implementation, stock  market  valuations  are  depressed  once  new  technologies  are 
invented.  This  is  because  once  small  innovative  firms  are  listed  on  the  market,  investors  shift  their 
attention  to  such  companies  and  neglect  ‘old’  technology  firms  that  have  lower  growth  potential. 
However, this transition is smooth through time and thus stock market valuations may appear to be 
under-valued  for  prolonged  periods.  Hobijn  and  Jovanovic  (2000)  present  empirical  evidence  that 
supports  their  theory  and  state  that  the  low  market  valuations  in  the  1970’s  were  a  result  of  the 
anticipation of the information technology era, and that during this period, ‘old’ technology firms were 
rationally being sold by investors. This was because a large claim to future dividends was not listed in the 
stock market yet, since most innovation was performed by small private firms. Furthermore, their model 
suggests that the extraordinary growth of stock market valuations in the 1990’s is the result of the long 
awaited productivity gains of the implementation of IT in the production process and the subsequent 
‘third industrial revolution’. However, the Hobijn and Jovanovic model does not provide any explanation 
for the 1987 stock market crash. As a final alternative, they consider the possibility that the evolution of 
stock prices can be explained by the presence of a speculative bubble: 
“Is the stock market bubble-prone? Did a positive bubble burst, or a negative bubble form some time between 
1968-1974? And today, do we see a positive bubble, especially in internet stocks?”5 
Although the authors consider speculative bubbles as an alternative, they dismiss the existence of bubbles 
on the basis that sunspot equilibria have no economic interpretation and cannot explain why stock market 
valuations behaved in this particular way. However, they provide no empirical evidence and only use 
rationality arguments against the existence of bubbles.  
 
In this paper, we will examine the evolution of the S&P 500 and its constituent sectors during the period 
January 1976 – 20016 in more detail in order to see whether the periodically collapsing speculative bubble 
                                                       
3 A model of technological growth that leads to booms and crashes, that allows for investor learning through the reduction of 
uncertainty about the limits of new technologies as these technologies become older, is presented in Jovanovic and Rob (1990). 
However, as uncertainty decreases in this model, so does the size of the ‘bad’ surprise in investor expectations. 
4 Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) claim that firms in the later IT intensive sectors should be better explained by the model and thus 
sectors with the highest IT investment after 1973 should experience the largest drops in value and then the largest increases. 
These sectors are Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, and the service sector in general. 
5 Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) p. 29. 
6 We were only able to obtain sector data after January 1976 and thus we will restrict our analysis to this period. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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models  can  explain  the  apparent  bubble  deviations  of  actual  prices  from  fundamental  values. 
Furthermore, in order to examine whether all sectors within the S&P 500 displayed bubble behavior 
during this period, we will estimate two speculative behavior models using sector data in an effort to see 
which sectors are responsible for the bubble like behavior of the aggregate S&P 500. If we find that only 
the IT sector, or the high growth sectors in general, contain a speculative bubble, then this could imply 
that bubbles are a statistical artefact caused by the use of dividend-based fundamentals7. If however, we 
find  that  other  sectors,  that  could  be  valued  more  accurately  using  dividends,  also  contain  bubble 
deviations then this could be evidence that bubbles are endemic rather than being caused by the presence 
of bubbles in one or two fashionable sectors.  
 
Merrill Lynch (2002) claim that three major bubble episodes have been observed in global equity sectors 
during this period. First, the energy bubble that peaked in 1980 and slowly deflated over the next 10 years, 
then the basic materials bubble that peaked in 1989 and is still deflating, and the IT bubble that peaked in 
March 2000. To our knowledge, we are the first to test whether sector market prices contain bubbles and 
to see whether bubble-like behavior is present throughout the entire S&P 500 Composite Index. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used to construct the ten sector 
indices and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the bubble models that we employ, while 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Descriptive statistics for the S&P 500 and GICS sectors 
This  paper  employs  data  on  the  10  S&P  500  Global  Industry  Classification  Standard  (GICS)  sector 
indices. The GICS is an industry classification system created by Standard & Poor’s in collaboration with 
Morgan Stanley Capital International, that is used to classify firms into 10 sectors, 23 industry groups, 59 
industries and 122 sub-industries according to their principal business activity. The sectors we examine 
are: Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Information 
Technology, Materials, Telecommunications and Utilities. The indices that correspond to these sectors are 
calculated using the same principles as the S&P 500 Composite Index and are therefore equivalent to the 
Composite Index.  
 
In order to construct stock market indices that correspond to the 10 GICS sectors, we take data from 
Datastream. However, because Datastream only provides data on these sectors after January 1993, we use 
the S&P Analysts’ Handbook, in order to identify the S&P 500 member companies that were included in 
the Index prior to this date. Using the list of companies that were included and excluded from the S&P 
                                                       
7 The Information Technology sector is the only sector in which more than 50% of its member firms do not pay dividends. Note, 
however, that this percentage has decreased dramatically in the 1990’s and that for all other sectors the percentage of dividend 
payers remains higher than 50%. Furthermore, although there is a sharp reduction in the percentage of firms paying dividends in 
the Health Care and the Telecommunications sectors, this percentage was traditionally high throughout the sample period. This 
implies that the only sector for which dividend based fundamentals may not be suitable is the Information Technology sector. 
Nevertheless, in order for the results of our analysis to be directly comparable across sectors we still construct dividend-based 
fundamentals for the Information Technology sector.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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500, in addition to the companies that were renamed or that merged, we are able to re-construct the GICS 
sector indices for the period January 1976 – January 2001, through the 300E program in Datastream. The 
300E program yields the monthly close, and the monthly series of the dividend yield, the price earnings 
ratio, the total volume and the market capitalization of the 10 sector indices. The appropriate series are 
then transformed into real series using the monthly CPI, and the implied cash dividends are obtained from 
the dividend yield, using the methodology described in Brooks and Katsaris (2005a). 
 
In Figure 1, we present the monthly close of the real S&P 500 Composite Index and the 10 GICS sector 
indices for the period January 1976 – January 2001. All indices are rescaled so that the nominal index 
value in January 1976 is equal to 100. From the graph, we can see that several sector price indices have 
increased significantly, outperforming the S&P 500 over the last 25 years and especially in the last six years 
of the sample. As expected, the sectors with the largest percentage growth are Information Technology 
(948%),  Health  Care  (1002%),  Financials  (1225%)  and  Consumer  Staples  (840%),  whereas  more 
traditional technology sectors such as Utilities and Materials have only increased by approximately 50%. 
Sectors  such  as  Energy,  Consumer  Discretionary,  Industrials  and  Telecommunications  have  yielded 
average returns of 400%. The S&P 500 Composite Index increased by 422% over the same period. 
 
Note, however, that at its peak in March 2000, the IT index had shown gains of 1700% which led 




Figures 2 and 3). Other sectors that have significantly increased their share in total market capitalization 
are Financials and Health Care, whereas sectors such as Materials, Utilities and Energy have experienced 
decreases in their share of total S&P 500 capitalization. The share in market capitalization is calculated as 
the total capitalization of a sector over the total capitalization of the S&P 500. By observing the weights of 
the individual sectors in the S&P 500 Index, we try to identify whether any evidence of bubbles in the 
period January 1976 – January 2001 can be attributed to particular sectors or to general stock price 
movements. 
 
In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the real S&P 500, and the GICS sector indices. We find that, 
as in the case of the S&P 500 Composite Index, nominal and real prices of the GICS sectors are not 
stationary in their levels although the null of a unit root can be strongly rejected in their first differences. 
From the second parts of the table, we can see that average returns and returns’ standard deviations vary 
significantly across sectors, with the highest average returns reported for the Financials, Health Care and 
Information  Technology  Sectors.  The  sectors  with  the  highest  standard  deviations  of  returns  are 
Information Technology, Materials, Financials and Consumer Discretionary. Furthermore, most sectors 
returns are not normally distributed, displaying significant negative skewness and excess kurtosis, with the ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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exception of Telecommunication Services and Utilities, for which the Jarque-Bera normality test cannot 
reject the null of normally distributed returns. 
 
Let us now examine the evolution of sector prices and implied dividends across time. As examples, in 
Figures 4 to 6, we present the monthly real GICS sector indices, the monthly real dividend yields, and the 
monthly real implied cash dividend series for the IT, industrials and materials sectors respectively. From 
the graphs we note that the price indices display significant variation around the implied dividend series, 
although the IT and industrials prices diverge significantly from the implied dividend series in the last 5 
years of our sample period. Note that until January 1996, the equally weighted average growth of all 
sectors since January 1976 was 285%, with the highest growth observed for the Consumer Staples (524%), 
Financials  (479%)  and Health  Care  (380%). The  Information  Technology  Sector  had  only  grown  by 
(249%) until January 1996, yielding most of the extraordinary growth in the last five years of the sample. 
The S&P 500 Composite Index had grown by 228% in the same period. Furthermore, from the graphs we 
can see that the dividend yields decreased to all time lows in the last 5 years, especially in the Information 
Technology  sector,  which explains  the  fact  that  by  2001,  the  aggregate  S&P  500  dividend  yield  had 
decreased to its lowest value in 10 years. Interestingly, the industrials sector shows a broadly similar 
pattern to the IT sector, although the price growth of the former is less spectacular than the latter. Thus 
many “old economy” sectors also appeared to show bubble-like growth in the 1990’s. The only sector that 
does not exhibit such behavior is the materials sector (Figure 6). Here, the deviation of actual prices from 
dividend-based fundamentals is far less pronounced and is corrected before the end of the sample period.  
 
Other periods of very low dividend yields (1929, 1973, and 1987) have been followed by significant 
corrections in S&P 500 market values, and this fact can also be observed for the individual sectors. For 
example, in the case of the Energy sector (not shown), the dividend yield was very low in December 1980 
and in August 1987. These periods were followed by a strong correction in prices, and the Energy Index 
lost 20% and 32% of its value within the next few months. Another example is the Utilities Index that 
displays a low dividend yield in the late 1970’s, in 1987, and 1993. Again, these periods where followed by 
a significant decrease in market values. Note that almost all dividend yields were also at their lowest levels 
in 1987.  
 
The Industrials index has a very similar evolution to the S&P 500 Composite, although it grows at a higher 
average  rate,  and  the  implied  bubble  deviations  have  a  similar  evolutionary  pattern  to  the  S&P  500 
Composite. Note that this sector has a stable participation in the S&P 500 over the last 25 years that 
ranges between 10 and 15%. When, however, we examine the Information Technology sector, we find 
that until 1995, this sector had a fairly constant participation in the S&P 500, and the implied bubble 
deviations were fairly average in size. Nevertheless, after 1993 there is a persistent and increasing positive 
bubble deviation that reaches 90% before it begins to deflate, causing the IT index to lose almost 50% of 
its value. Note that this is consistent with the common belief that there was a bubble in the Information ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Technology sector that burst in 2000. Nevertheless, the index still appears highly overvalued at the end of 
our  sample,  and  the  evolution  of  this  sector  could  explain  why  the  S&P  500  Composite  diverges 
significantly from the dividend-based fundamentals.  
 
Merrill Lynch state that there was a bubble in the global basic materials sector that peaked in 1989 and 
which was still deflating at the end of our sample period. However, Figure 6 suggests that the estimated 
bubble deviation does not display such behavior. Although the Materials index appears to contain a 
negative bubble in the 1970’s, the large bubble deviation formed in the 1980’s slowly deflates until 1990, 
and then remains at a fairly constant level until the end of the sample. Note that this index follows the 
overall trend of the fundamental values and does not contain the systematic and increasing divergences in 
the 1990’s that are associated with the presence of speculative bubbles.  
 
As stated above, some critics may argue that the comparison of prices and dividends is not an efficient 
measure of the relative performance for all sectors, especially for high technology sectors. For this reason, 
we also examine the evolution of prices relative to earnings-price ratios8. We find again that the earnings-
price ratio is low prior to several corrections in prices, whereas it is quite high before significant market 
advances9. Overall, in the last 10 years of our sample, the earnings-price ratios are quite low for most of 
the sectors and especially low for the Information Technology sector. Note that traditionally, high P/E 
ratios denote a market expectation of high future earnings growth. Therefore, we should expect that the 
E/P ratio for the high growth sectors in our sample should be lower than the E/P ratios of the Utilities 
and Materials sectors. However, several researchers and market practitioners argue that the evolution of 
prices in the 1990’s, resulted in unrealistically low E/P ratios (high P/E ratios) in both high technology 
and traditional sectors10.  
 
Overall, from the graphs, we note that the GICS sectors indices display behavior that could be considered 
consistent  with  the  existence  of  speculative  bubbles,  that  is  an  apparent  under  valuation  relative  to 
dividends in the 1970’s, an increasing over-valuation up until 1987, and an ever increasing overvaluation 
after that. However, some sector indices display significantly more variation around dividends than others. 
In the next sections, we will construct and describe the statistical properties of these bubble deviations 
and then test whether the evolution of market values of the 10 sectors is consistent with the presence of 
speculative bubbles. 
 
3. Models for Periodically Partially Collapsing Speculative Bubbles in Asset Prices 
                                                       
8 Not shown due to space constraints but available from the authors on request. 
9 The earnings used in the calculation of the ratio are the three-year moving average of real earnings in order to smooth out the 
effect of abnormal earnings. 
10 For example, several dot.com companies had P/E ratios larger than 1000 at the peak of the internet ‘bubble’. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Under  the  assumptions  of  rational  expectations,  risk-neutrality,  constant  discount  rates  and  market 
equilibrium, the no arbitrage condition must hold and thus the price of a stock must be given by the 
present value of its future cash flows: 
) 1 (










+ +                   (1) 
In equation (1), 
a
t p  is the actual price of the stock at time t,  t d  is the dividend paid by the stock in period 
t,  (.) t E is  the  mathematical  expectations  operator,  i  is  the  constant  expected  real  rate  of  return  in 
equilibrium that is equal to the discount rate11. Equation (1) shows that the actual price of a stock must be 
equal to the present value of the expected future price at which the security will be sold plus the expected 
dividend the investor will receive at time t+1. 
 
If we allow for multi-period horizons, then equation (1) can be updated with the expectation of the price 
at t+1 and substituted into the original equation. Substituting recursively for all future prices in an infinite 
planning horizon and using the property of rational expectations  ) (. )] (. [ 2 2 1 + + + = t t t t t E E E  will yield the 















p                 (2) 
 
Equation (2) describes the fundamental price of a stock (
f
t p ) under an infinite planning horizon. If we 
allow the actual market price of the stock to deviate from its fundamental value then the actual stock-price 





t u b p p + + =                   (3) 
where  t b  is the bubble component at period t, and  t u  is a zero mean, constant variance error term that 
contains the unexpected innovation of both the bubble term and of the fundamental component. The 
bubble component ( t b ) is simply the difference between the actual price and the fundamental price of the 
security and is assumed here to have an evolutionary process that causes the systematic divergence of 
actual prices from their fundamental values. This bubble deviation can have different generating processes 
depending on the type of bubble that is included in the stock price. There are several types of bubbles that 
have  different  characteristics,  different  evolutionary  processes  and  are  generated  by  different  factors. 
Nevertheless, all rational bubble processes must satisfy the no arbitrage condition since the price of the 
security must satisfy (1).  
 
                                                       
11 Fama and French state that the expected or required return of an asset is the discount rate that relates a present value with its 
future cash flows (Fama and French (1988)). ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Blanchard (1979), and Blanchard and Watson (1982) formulate a speculative bubble model in which the 
bubble component continues to grow with explosive expectations in the next time period with probability 
q, or crashes to zero with probability 1-q. If the bubble collapses then the actual price will be equal to the 
asset’s fundamental value. In their model, the explosive behavior of bubble returns compensates the 
investor for the increased risk of a bubble crash as the bubble grows in size. According to Blanchard and 
Watson (1982), the expected bubble in period t+1 will be generated by the following stochastic process: 
q
b i t ) 1 ( +
         with probability q  
= + ) ( 1 t t b E                     (4) 
0           with probability 1-q 
where q is the constant probability that the bubble will continue to exist in period t+1, (0<q<1). Equation 
(4) shows that if the bubble does not burst in period t+1, then the expected bubble must grow at a rate 
higher than i in order to compensate the investor for the probability of collapse. On the other hand, the 
bubble might burst in period t+1 with probability 1-q and so the expected bubble will be equal to zero.  
 
From (4) we note that if the bubble term at period t+1 crashes to zero then it cannot regenerate since the 
expected bubble is equal to zero. This implies that there can be only one observed bubble in any financial 
time series (Diba and Grossman (1988a)). Furthermore, in (4) it is assumed that the bubble crashes 
immediately to its collapsing state value. These are restrictive assumptions, since it is plausible that there 
could be several bubble episodes in a financial time series or that a bubble could slowly deflate for several 
time periods or it might stop growing and remain at an approximately constant level for some time and 
then collapse or start growing again. In 1929 and 1987, the market peaked in late August and crashed in 
October whereas the strong correction in the Tokyo Stock Exchange took several months after January 
1990. 
 
Moreover, the explosive nature of bubbles leads Diba and Grossman (1988b) to conclude that under 
rational expectations, negative bubbles cannot exist since investors cannot rationally expect the value of a 
stock to become negative in finite time. This arises since if a negative rational speculative bubble exists, 
the  bubble  will  grow  geometrically  causing  the  stock  price  to  decrease  without  bound  and  become 
negative in finite time. However, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) claim that the arguments against the 
possibility of negative bubbles rely on a very strict form of rationality. Although the probability that the 
stock price will become zero or arbitrarily large (depending on the form of the bubble) is positive, this 
probability might be too small or the event may happen in the too distant future and thus investors decide 
to ignore it12. Finally, in the original model of Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and Watson (1982), the 
probability of the bubble continuing to exist is non-observable and assumed constant.  
                                                       
12 See also Weil (1990) on the possibility of price decreasing bubbles. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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In order to lift the requirement for these unrealistic restrictions, van Norden and Shaller (hereafter vNS, 
1993) formulate a periodically, partially collapsing, positive and negative speculative bubble model that has 















) 1 ( −
−
+
    with probability  ) ( t B q   
= + ) ( 1 t t b E                     (5) 
a
t t p B u ) (         with probability  ) ( 1 t B q −  
In (5),  t B  is the size of the bubble relative to the actual price 
a
t p ,  ) / (
a
t t t p b B = ,  ) ( t B u  is a continuous 
and everywhere differentiable function such that:  0 ) 0 ( = u  and  1 / ) ( 0 < ∂ ∂ ≤ t t B B u ,  ) ( t B q  is the 
probability of the bubble continuing to exist that is a negative function of the relative size of the bubble.  
 
As noted by Kindleberger (1989), a crash becomes more likely as the relative size of the bubble becomes 
larger. To incorporate this and to ensure that the estimates of the probability of survival are bounded 
between zero and one, vNS employ a probit specification and allow the probability of survival to depend 
on the relative size of the bubble, similar to the specification used by Bollerslev and Hodrick (1995): 
  ) ( ) ( , , t b q o q t B B q β β + Ω =                 (6) 
where  Ω is the standard normal cumulative density function,  ) ( ,o q β Ω  is the constant probability of 
being in the collapsing regime and  b q, β  is the sensitivity of the probability of collapse to the absolute 
relative size of the bubble. In equation (6), vNS allow for negative speculative bubbles by modeling the 
probability of the bubble surviving as a function of the absolute size of the bubble.  
 
vNS also allow for partial bubble collapses13 by letting the expected bubble size in the collapsing state be a 
function of the relative bubble size. In this setting, the expected relative bubble size of period t+1 in the 
collapsing state must be smaller than the expected bubble relative size in the surviving state and not bigger 
than the bubble in period t. The assumption of a continuous and everywhere differentiable function is 
required so that they are able to linearize the model. This functional form is not imposed on the data but 
is required in order to derive empirically testable implications from the bubble model.  
 
The vNS model can be used in order to specify asset returns as state dependent, where the state is 
unobservable. This implies that the security’s gross returns are given, under certain assumptions about the 
dividend process, by the following non-linear switching model14: 
                                                       
13 Evans (1991) and Hall and Sola (1993) also consider partial bubble collapses.  
14 For a derivation of the equations, the reader is referred to the working paper version van Norden and Schaller (1997) available 
at the Bank of Canada web-site: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/res/wp97-2.htm.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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where  1 + t r  denotes the gross return of period t+1 conditioning on the fact that the state at time t+1 is the 
survival state (S) or the collapsing state (C) and on all other available information at time t,  t W  is an 
unobserved indicator that determines the state in which the process is at time t, and M is the gross 
fundamental return on the security. In order to estimate the model, vNS linearize equations (7) and (8) 
and derive a linear regime switching model for gross stock market returns with a single state-independent 
probability of switching regimes ( ) ( t B q ): 
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In (9), 
S
t u 1 +  and 
C
t u 1 +  are the unexpected gross returns of period t+1 in the surviving and in the collapsing 
regime respectively and are assumed zero mean and constant variance i.i.d. normal random variables. vNS 
estimate the above three equations with maximum likelihood, using the value weighted index of all stocks 
from  the  Center  for  Research  on  Security  Prices  (CRSP)  database  for  the  period  January  1926  to 
December 1989. vNS find that there is non-linear predictability in stock market returns and that the 
deviations of actual prices from fundamental values are a significant factor in predicting both the level and 
the generating state of returns. Furthermore, from the switching speculative bubble model, vNS derive 
conditional probabilities of a crash and of a rally in the next time period and find that their model has 
explanatory power for several periods of apparently speculative behavior of the data, although some of the 
observed crashes can be explained better by a model of regime switching in fundamental values. 
 
Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) propose an extension of the above model to incorporate a measure of 
abnormal volume in the equations for returns in the surviving regime and in the probability of bubble 
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In (10),  ) , (
x
t t V B q  is the probability of the bubble continuing to exist that is a function of the relative 
absolute size of the bubble and the measure of abnormal volume where  0 / ) , ( < ∂ ∂ t
x
t t B V B q  and 




t t V V B q , and 
x
t V  is a measure of unusual volume in period t. Following vNS, in equation ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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(10) the expected size of the bubble is a function of the probability of a crash, the size of the bubble at 
period t and the function  ) ( t B u , which is the relative size of the bubble in the collapsing state. The 
probability of the bubble continuing to exist is a negative function of the absolute (since we allow negative 
bubbles to exist) size of the bubble, and the measure of abnormal volume. From (10) we can derive the 
gross  returns  on  the  stock  when  a  bubble  is  present  under  the  assumption  that  dividends  follow  a 
geometric random walk with a constant drift15. Under this assumption, we can show that the expected 
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x
t V q t b q q
x
t t t V B V B q S W P γ β β + + Ω = = = +         (13) 
where  V q, γ  is the sensitivity of the probability of survival to the measure of abnormal volume. Note that 
the measure of abnormal volume affects the expected returns on the asset only indirectly through the 
probability of the process being in state S or C in period t+1. Abnormal volume is thus suggested to signal 
an increase in the size of the tail of the distribution of expected returns that would signify a collapse of the 
bubble. We follow vNS and select a probit model for the probability of survival ( ) ( 1 S W P t = + ) since it 
satisfies the conditions set above and it ensures that probability estimates are bounded between zero and 
one. Furthermore, it should be noted that equations (11) through (13) satisfy the no-arbitrage condition 
since the ex-ante expected gross return on the bubbly asset is equal to the expected gross return on the 
bubble-free asset (M) and therefore it is rational for a risk-neutral investor to hold the bubbly asset. The 
realized return if the bubble survives is greater than the required gross return (M), whereas if the bubble 
collapses it yields negative actual returns (positive in the case of a negative bubble).  
 
Equations (11), (12) and (13) are non-linear and very difficult to estimate. In order to estimate these 
equations, we linearize them by taking the first order Taylor series approximation of the model around an 
arbitrary B0 and 




t V S t b S S t u V B r 1 , , 0 , 1 + + + + + = β β β               (14) 
C
t t b C C t u B r 1 , 0 , 1 + + + + = β β                 (15) 
) ( ) , ( ) ( , , 0 , 1
x
t V q t b q q
x
t t t V B V B q S W P γ β β + + Ω = = = +         (16) 
where: 
S
t u 1 +  is the unexpected gross return in the surviving regime and 
C
t u 1 +  is the unexpected gross return 
in the collapsing regime.  
                                                       
15 This is a common assumption in the literature; see for example Fama and French (1988), Kleidon (1986a). 
16 Proof of these equations is not presented here in the interest of brevity but is available in an appendix upon request from the 
authors. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Equation (14) states that the returns in the surviving regime are a function of the relative size of the 
bubble and of the measure of abnormal volume. In effect, equation (14) implies that as the bubble grows, 
investors demand higher returns in order to compensate them for the probability of a bubble collapse and 
since abnormal volume signals a possible change in the long run trend in equity prices, investors want to 
be compensated for this risk as well. The above linear switching regression model has a single state-
independent probability of switching regimes  ) ( 1 S r P t+  that is a function of the relative size of the 
bubble and of the measure of abnormal volume. We estimate the augmented model under the assumption 
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where  ξ   is  the  set  of  parameters  over  which  we  maximize  the  likelihood  function  including 
C S V q B q q C C V S b S S σ σ γ β β β β β β β , , , , , , , , , , , 0 , 0 , 0 , , , 0 , ,  ω   is  the  standard  normal  probability  density 
function (pdf),  S σ  ( C σ ) is the standard deviation of the disturbances in the surviving (collapsing) regime, 
and  ) ( 1 ) ( 1 1 S W P C W P t t = − = = + + .
 
Note  that  the  maximization  of  this  log-likelihood  function 
produces consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters in ξ , as it does not require any assumptions 
about which regime generated a given observation. The above model is similar to the models described in 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1976).  
 
From the first order Taylor series expansion, we can derive certain conditions that must hold if the 
periodically collapsing speculative bubble model has explanatory power for stock market returns. If the 
above model can explain the variation in future returns, then this would be evidence in favor of the 
presence of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles in the data. These restrictions are: 
0 , 0 , C S β β ≠                     (a) 
0 , < b C β                     (b) 
b C b S , , β β >                     (c) 
0 , < b q β                     (d) 
0 , < V q γ                     (e) 
0 , > V S β                     (f) ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Restriction (a) implies that the mean return across the two regimes is different, so that there exist two 
distinct regimes, although we cannot say anything about the relative size of these coefficients. Restriction 
(b) implies that the expected return should be negative if the collapsing regime is observed. This means 
that the bubble must be smaller in the following period if the bubble collapses. Note that the opposite 
holds for negative bubbles: the larger the negative bubble, the more positive the returns in the collapsing 
regime. Restriction (c) ensures that the bubble yields higher (lower) returns if a positive (negative) bubble 
is observed in the surviving regime than in the collapsing regime. Restriction (d) must hold since the 
probability of the bubble continuing to exist is expected to decrease as the size of the bubble increases. 
Restrictions (a) to (d) are equivalent to the restrictions derived by vNS. The additional restriction (e) must 
hold so that abnormally high volume signals an imminent collapse of the bubble. Finally, restriction (f) 
states that the coefficient on the abnormal volume measure in the state equation must be greater than zero 
since, as volume increases, investors perceive an increase in market risk.  
 
We examine the power of the model to capture bubble effects in the returns of the S&P 500 and its 
sectors by testing the model against three simpler specifications that capture stylized features of stock 
market returns. These models are nested within the speculative bubble model. We repeat these tests and 
also examine the augmented model against the simpler vNS model using a likelihood ratio test. Firstly, we 
examine whether the effects captured by the switching model can be explained by a more parsimonious 
model of changing volatility. In order to test this alternative, we follow vNS and jointly impose the 
following restrictions:  
0 , 0 , S C β β =                             (18.1) 
0 , , , , , = = = = = V q b q V S b C b S γ β β β β                       (18.2) 
C S σ σ ≠                             (18.3) 
Restriction (18.1) implies that the mean return across the two regimes is the same and restriction (18.2) 
states the bubble deviation has no explanatory power for next period returns or for the probability of 
switching regimes. The later point suggests that there is a constant probability of switching between a high 
variance and low variance regime as this is stated in restriction (18.3). 
 
In order to separate restrictions (18.1) and (18.2), we examine whether returns can be characterized by a 
simple mixture of normal distributions model, which only allows mean returns and variances to differ 
across the two regimes. This mixture of normal distributions model implies the following restrictions: 
0 , , , , , = = = = = V q b q V S b C b S γ β β β β               (19) 
 
Another possible alternative is that of mean reversion in prices (fads) as described by Cutler et al. (1991). 
Under the fads model, returns are linearly predictable although mean returns do not differ across regimes. 
Furthermore,  the  deviation  of  actual  prices  from  the  fundamentals  has  no  predictive  ability  for  the ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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probability of switching regimes. The returns in the two regimes are characterized by different variances of 
residuals but are the same linear functions of bubble deviations. The fads model is thus: 
1 , 0 1 + + + + = t S t b
S
t u B r β β  
1 , 0 1 + + + + = t C t b
C
t u B r β β                 (20) 
  ) ( 0 , q t q β Ω =  
In the above equations,  ) , 0 ( ~ 1 S t N u σ +  with probability qt,  ) , 0 ( ~ 1 C t N u σ +  with probability 1-qt. 
As a final statistical test, we also examine the robustness of our model against the more parsimonious vNS 
model by testing whether abnormal volume should be included in the speculative bubble model. The 
restrictions of this last test are: 
0 , , = = V q V S γ β                   (21) 
The results of the speculative bubble models and the implied restrictions are discussed in Section 4. 
 
Measures of Fundamental Values 
A number of methods for constructing measures of fundamental values can be found in the literature, 
including approaches based on a dividend multiple measure, or based on an augmented Gordon growth 
model. While the Campbell and Shiller (1987) methodology can allow for predictable time-variation in the 
growth rate of dividends, this approach assumes that both the actual spread and the dividend growth rate 
are stationary. Nevertheless, for some of our sectors, the actual spread is not stationary, and this may lead 
to spurious regression problems and inefficient forecasts of the theoretical spread for those sectors. We 
therefore adopt the dividend multiple measure of fundamentals employed by van Norden and Schaller 
(1999).    Before  describing this  approach,  we  should  state  that  we  recognize  the  limitations  of using 
dividend-based  fundamentals  to  value  high  growth  sectors  such  as  Information  Technology, 
Telecommunications and Health Care17. It is a common view that such high growth sectors should not be 
valued  according  to  tangible  assets or  balance  sheets since  most  of  the  value  added  in  such sectors 
originates  from  ‘soft’  variables,  such  as  intellectual  human  capital,  patents,  strategic  alliances,  joint 
ventures, market share, and in the case of internet companies, other variables such as web traffic and 
number of unique visitors (see for example, Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000), Rajgopal, Kotha and 
Venkatchalam  (2000)).  Nevertheless,  Damodaran  (2000)  and  Hand  and  Landsman  (1999)  argue,  and 
empirically show, that the fundamentals of equity valuation still apply to high technology firms and that 
classic accounting variables are relevant in the pricing of such stocks. However, such valuations are very 
noisy and other ‘soft’ variables often complement high technology stock valuations. 
 
vNS (1999) show that if the discount rate is constant, then stock market prices follow the period-by-
period arbitrage condition: 
                                                       
17 Note that Health Care includes the Biotechnology and the Pharmaceuticals industries. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Assuming that dividends follow a geometric random walk, i.e. that log dividends follow a random walk 























We use the sample mean of the price-dividend ratio to approximate ρ . In this setting, the relative bubble 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
In this Section we will present the results of the models presented above for the S&P 500 Composite and 
the 10 GICS sector indices. The models we estimate are the original van Norden and Schaller model, and 
the augmented model that contains volume as a predictor and classifier of returns. In order to test for the 
no-bubble  hypothesis,  we  perform  likelihood  ratio  tests  for  the  implied  model  restrictions  on  the 
coefficient estimates, and in order to ensure that we are not misinterpreting stylized facts about stock 
market returns, such as volatility regimes, mixtures of normals and mean reversion, as evidence in favour 
of bubbles, we use likelihood ratio tests in order to statistically verify that we are capturing more of the 
variability of returns than these simpler alternatives. 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, we present the results of the S&P 500 Composite index and each of the sectors for the 
vNS and augmented models respectively using the dividend multiple measure of fundamental values for 
the period January 1976 – January 2001. The first panels of the tables contain the coefficient estimates of 
the nine models. In the second panels of the tables, we present the log-likelihood function values at the 
optimum, and the three information criteria. The third panels of the tables contain the results of the 
likelihood ratio tests for the speculative behavior coefficient restrictions. All blank elements imply that no 
restriction is tested. Finally, the last panel of the tables contain the LR test results of the alternative model 
specifications. Therefore, we test whether a mixture of normals model can explain returns better than a 
simple volatility regimes model, and in turn whether a fads model, captures any additional characteristics 
in the data. Since the fads and the mixture of normals models contain the same number of estimated 
parameters, we select the one with the largest log-likelihood value.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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From the results, we can see that for the S&P 500 as a whole, the null hypothesis of no-bubbles can be 
strongly rejected since the speculative behavior models’ restrictions are satisfied by the data (i.e. their 
respective nulls are rejected in favour of bubble behavior). Specifically, note that in the original vNS 
model the bubble deviation is significant in predicting both the levels and the generating state of returns, 
and that as the bubble grows, the returns in the surviving regime become increasingly higher (when a 
positive bubble is present) whereas the returns in the collapsing regime are a negative function of the 
bubble size. Moreover, the null hypothesis that the probability of being in the surviving regime is not a 
function  of  the  absolute  bubble  size  ( 0 , = b q β )  is  rejected  in  favour  of  the  one  sided  alternative. 
Furthermore,  the  model  identifies  two  distinct  regimes  of  stock  market  returns:  one  in  which  small 
positive returns with small variance are observed and one in which returns are large and negative and have 
large variance. Although coefficient estimates appear to be consistent with the periodically collapsing 
speculative bubbles model, it appears that the vNS model cannot capture an additional proportion of the 
variability of returns, when we compare it to the two stylized alternatives of volatility regimes, and fads.  
 
However, once we examine the augmented model for the S&P 500 Index, we see that all the coefficients 
satisfy their theoretical restrictions (i.e. the null is rejected in favour of the hypothesized alternative), and 
that the augmented model, which contains volume as a predictor and classifier of returns, is able to 
explain returns better than the vNS model and the three stylized alternatives. More importantly, it appears 
that as the size of the bubble deviation is increasing and the bubble accelerates, the probability of being in 
the steady growth regime decreases. Furthermore, as the bubble grows in size, the probability of being in 
the surviving-explosive regime decreases, and the expected return in the collapsing state becomes even 
smaller (when a positive bubble is present).  
 
Overall, there is a very small probability of being in the collapsing regime (0.3%) when the bubble size is 
zero and volume is normal. Nevertheless, as the bubble increases, this probability increases dramatically. 
From  the  above,  we  can  conclude  that  the  divergence  of  the  S&P  500  from  the  dividend  multiple 
fundamental  values  can  be  considered  the  result  of  speculative  behavior.  Therefore,  the  Hobijn  and 
Jovanovic (2000) assertion that a bubble would not be able to explain the evolution of the S&P 500 in the 
last 25 years is rejected. We will return to this point shortly. 
 
Turning our attention to the sector indices, overall, the results are indicative of the presence of bubbles in 
many of the sectors, namely Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, 
Industrials,  and  Telecommunications.  The  Information  Technology  sector  is  better  explained  by  our 
augmented  model  of  speculative  behavior,  whereas,  contrary  to  the  statement  of  Merrill  Lynch,  the 
Materials sector index is better explained by a simple volatility regimes model. The Utilities index appears ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
Copyright © 2006 Brooks and Katsaris  18 
to be mean reverting, since the information criteria are minimized for this model. Let us examine these 
results in greater detail. 
 
When we examine the Consumer Staples index, the collapsing explosive regime has a significantly lower 
average probability of occurring. Nevertheless, as the bubble grows in size, the probability of observing 
the collapsing regime increases dramatically since, if the measure of abnormal volume and the spread of 
actual returns are equal to zero, when the bubble size is equal to 40%, the probability of observing the 
collapsing regime is close to 30%. More importantly, all the coefficients have the right sign and are 
significantly  different  from  zero,  and  the LR  tests’ results  imply  that  the  augmented  model  captures 
additional information contained in the index returns. 
 
Turning our attention now to the Energy index, a sector that is commonly considered to contain a bubble 
in the early 1980’s, the bubble deviations in the surviving state equation are now insignificant in both 
speculative model specifications. Nevertheless, all the theoretical restrictions on the coefficient signs and 
magnitudes are satisfied by the data. From the estimates of the model, we calculate that the probability of 
the next period returns being generated by the collapsing state in January 1981 was 34%. The index lost 
21% in January and February 1981, which implies that the speculative behavior model could potentially be 
used to predict the level and the generating state of returns. 
 
From Tables 2 and 3, we see that the financials index displays significant bubble behavior around this 
trend,  since  all  of  the  estimated  coefficients  have  the  correct  sign,  and  an  economically  meaningful 
magnitude.  Note  that  the  value  of  this  index  displays  one  of  the  largest  increases  over  our  sample, 
although the overall trend could be justified by the evolution of the underlying fundamental values.  
 
Several market practitioners claim that a biotechnology bubble was formed in the early 1990’s and that 
this bubble burst in 1992. Yet the results show that, over the last 25 years, several bubbles grew and burst 
in the Health Care sector. These bubble deviations display bubble behavior since the speculative behavior 
models are able to explain both the levels and the generating state of returns in this sector. From the 
estimated coefficients of the augmented model, we can calculate that the probability of being in the 
collapsing regime in the next time period was 47% in January 1992. 
 
The same conclusions can be drawn if we examine the Industrials and the Telecommunication Services 
sectors, since the information criteria indicate that the augmented speculative behavior model can better 
capture the variability of returns. Furthermore, the coefficients in the state and classifying equations are 
significantly  different  from  zero  and  have  the  correct  sign,  and  the  LR  tests  again  reject  the  more 
parsimonious  alternatives.  Note  that  for  the  Telecommunications  sector,  we  showed  above  that  the 
bubble deviations in the 1990’s never entirely collapsed but remain at a fairly constant value of 30%.  
 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Let us now examine the Information Technology sector. As noted earlier, this index experiences the 
largest increase over the sample period and contains the largest bubble deviation. Although almost all of 
the speculative behavior model coefficients have the correct sign and are statistically significant, it appears 
that the surviving regime for this index is very persistent. Note that when the bubble deviation and the 
measure for abnormal volume are equal to zero, the probability of observing the collapsing regime is very 
small.  Furthermore,  it  would  take  a  bubble  size  in  excess  of  60% for the  probability  of  the bubble 
surviving to start decreasing. This result can be attributed to the fact that the estimated bubble deviation is 
very  large  and  increases  persistently  during  the  1990’s,  and  we  therefore  conclude  that  neither  the 
augmented model nor the original van Norden and Schaller model can accurately capture the variability of 
the  returns  of  this  sector.  This  could  be  indicative  that  we  should  not  be  using  dividend-based 
fundamentals to value this sector. 
 
Turning now to the Materials and the Utilities sectors, we find, contrary to common opinion that the 
Materials index contained a bubble in the early 1980’s, this index is better explained by a simple volatility 
regimes model, with an average return of 0.05% per month. With the exception of the Hannan and Quinn 
criterion, the model restriction tests and the information criteria indicate that the simple volatility regimes 
model is adequate. Moreover, we note that the speculative models’ coefficients are mostly insignificant, 
and some have an opposite than expected sign. Similarly, when we examine the Utilities sector results, we 
find that the two-regime mean reversion model is able to capture the characteristics of returns better than 
any of the alternative specifications. This result is expected since this sector contains “old economy” 
stocks and the actual index varies around its fundamental values, so that the bubble deviations do not 
expand or collapse abruptly.   
 
We also estimated all of the models using the Campbell and Shiller measure of fundamental values in 
order to examine the robustness of our results against fundamentals that allow for predictable variation in 
the dividend growth rate. These results are not presented here for brevity but can be obtained from the 
authors on request. With the exception of the Consumer Staples, Health Care, and Industrials indices, the 
results are quantitatively identical to the results for the dividend multiple fundamental values and are 
always qualitatively the same. Any differences in the estimated coefficients and/or the conclusions about 
the relevant model (especially in the Consumer Staples sector) may be attributable to the non-stationarity 
of the actual spread used in the estimation of the VAR. 
 
From the above, we can conclude that the bubble deviations of the S&P 500 from its dividend based 
fundamental values are a result of the deviation of not only the Information Technology sector but of the 
deviations of other, more traditional, sectors from their fundamental values. In Figure 7, we can see that 
the large negative bubble deviation in the late 1970’s can be attributed to the Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Financials, Health-Care, Industrials, and Information Technology sectors. This finding 
is in contrast to Hobijn and Jovanovic’s (2000) claim that the undervaluation of the 1970’s can mainly be ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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attributed to the Financials and the IT sectors. However, their model suggests that these sectors and the 
services sector in general should experience the highest growth in the 1980’s and the 1990’s because of the 
listing on the stock market of new, high growth firms that contain a large share of the claim to future 
dividends. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to examine this hypothesis directly, and test whether 
the portfolio of 1970’s incumbent firms contains a bubble as well. 
 
Nevertheless, our finding that almost 67% of the S&P 500 was significantly undervalued with respect to 
dividend based fundamentals is a good starting point. Furthermore, we note that even though these 
bubbles collapsed in 1980, other large negative bubble deviations were formed in 1981-1982 that caused 
the index to be undervalued by 32% at its most extreme. The sectors with the largest bubble deviations at 
that  time  were  the  Energy,  Industrials,  Consumer  Staples,  and  Telecommunication  sectors,  which 
represented 44% of the S&P 500. In 1982, all sectors excluding the Consumer Discretionary sector were 
undervalued. In most cases, these negative bubbles burst by the end of 1982 and significant positive 
bubble  deviations  formed  in  the  Consumer  Discretionary,  Financials,  Information  Technology  and 
Industrial sectors in 1983-1984. However, the S&P 500 Composite only became overvalued by 10% 
because of the offsetting negative deviations in the Energy, Utilities and Telecoms sectors. Almost all the 
GICS  sectors  developed  a  positive  bubble  deviation  in  the  period  1984-1987,  with  the  exception  of 
Utilities. These deviations burst with the October crash. 
  
Turning  our  attention  now  to  the  1990’s  we  can  see  that  several  sectors,  namely  the  Consumer 
Discretionary, Energy, Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology and Telecommunications indices 
where overvalued by at least 30% in January 1996. These sectors represented almost 70% of the S&P 500 
Composite index, which was over valued in the same period by almost 40%. More importantly, we note 
that  in  January  2000,  the  estimated  bubble  deviation  of  the  Composite  index  of  60%,  was  mainly 
attributable  to  the  Consumer  Discretionary,  Health  Care,  Industrials,  Information  Technology  and 
Telecommunication indices that represented 70% of the Index. Even if we do not take the Information 
Technology sector into account, more than 45% of the S&P 500 was significantly overvalued by at least 
40% relative to long-term dividend-based fundamentals.  
 
One point worth noting is that after March 2000, when the bubble deviations in the aforementioned 
sectors began to deflate, sectors that were overvalued by less than 40% relative to the dividend multiple 
fundamental values in January 2000, namely the Consumer Staples, Financials, Materials and Utilities 
indices, experienced a relatively significant increase in their bubble deviations until the end of our sample. 
These sectors accounted for 24% of the total capitalization of the Composite index in January 2000, and 
by January 2001 their share had grown to 32%. Note that the Consumer Staples, Materials, and Utilities 
sectors experience the largest increase in their bubble deviation in the end of 2000. This could be taken as 
evidence  that  once  investors  realized  that  the  bubble  deviation  was  bursting,  they  shifted  funds  to 
relatively “safe” sectors with a smaller risk of observing a bubble collapse.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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From the results presented above, we concluded that the Materials and Utilities sectors do not appear to 
contain significant speculative behavior, and from the figures presented above, we can see that although 
the Financials and Consumer Staples indices did in fact contain periodically collapsing speculative bubbles 
in the last 25 years and in the mid 1990’s, the observed bubble deviations had deflated significantly 
throughout 1998 and 1999. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the presence of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles in the S&P 500 and 
its constituent sectors for the period January 1976 – January 2001. Market practitioners and academic 
researchers have suggested that the Information Technology, Health Care, Energy and Materials sectors 
were significantly affected by speculative bubbles in the last 25 years, but by implication, that other sectors 
remained bubble-free. To our knowledge, we are the first to directly test for the presence of bubbles in 
specific stock market sectors, and we believe that our findings shed light on the behavior of these sector 
indices.  
 
In order to obtain the longest possible data sample, we use the S&P Analysts Handbook and re-construct 
the 10 GICS sectors for the period January 1976 – January 2001. The resulting indices are equivalent to 
the  S&P  500  and  represent  the  ten  major  economic  sectors  of  the  member  firms  (Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology, 
Materials, Telecommunications and Utilities). Using a fundamental measure based on dividend-multiples, 
we  estimate  two  speculative  behavior  models:  a  model  by  van  Norden  and  Schaller  (1997),  and  an 
augmented model proposed by Brooks and Katsaris (2005b). Furthermore, we estimate five alternative 
models  that  capture  stylized  facts  about securities  returns  and  that  are  nested within  the  speculative 
behavior models. This is done in order to test whether the speculative behavior models capture any 
additional information about the variation of returns.  
 
From  the  results,  we  can  conclude  that  the  augmented  speculative  behavior  model  has  superior 
explanatory power than all the alternative models for 7 out of 10 sectors. Thus, in the sample examined, 
the S&P 500 Composite and these 7 sectors appear to contain a bubble. The bubbly sectors are Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, and Telecommunications. 
In most cases, we found that the size of the bubble deviation and the measure of abnormal volume are 
significant predictors of returns. Although the sensitivity of the probabilities of being in a given regime to 
the size of the bubble, the measure of abnormal volume and the spread of actual returns vary significantly 
across sectors, for all sectors, the probability of observing the collapsing regime is a positive function of 
the absolute bubble size and the measure of abnormal volume. We find that the probability of the bubble 
continuing to exist decreases dramatically for large bubble sizes and abnormal volume realizations. Even 
though the augmented model yields a large and persistent probability of the collapsing regime in the last ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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five years of the sample without a crash actually occurring, in 2000 the IT index lost 50% of its value, and 
by August 2002, the IT index was down 80% from its all time high. Note that the estimated bubble 
deviation when the IT index peaked in March 2000 was 91%. This could be evidence that investors have 
now driven prices in this index back towards its dividend-based fundamentals. 
 
Finally, we show that a mixture of normals and a fads model better explain the Materials and the Utilities 
indices respectively than a speculative bubble model. Although some practitioners claim that a bubble was 
formed in the early 1980’s in the global basic materials sector, we find no evidence that the perceived 
bubble deviations display periodically collapsing speculative bubble behavior since the size of the bubble is 
unable to significantly predict the level or the generating state of returns.  
 
One particularly interesting observation is that at the end of our sample after the IT bubble has begun to 
deflate, there is an increase in the deviations of actual prices from fundamental values in the four sectors 
with  the  lowest  bubble  deviations  in  March  2000.  These  sectors  were  Consumer  Staples,  Financials, 
Materials and Utilities. This could be taken as evidence that investors shifted their capital to sectors with a 
smaller probability of a bubble collapse, since very few investors would completely liquidate their holdings 
in the S&P 500. This can be considered as further evidence that market participants were aware that some 
sectors had a smaller bubble deviation, and were thus less at risk from the bubble bursting in 2000 and 
2001. 
 
To summarize, our central conclusion is that bubble-like behavior is not confined to a small segment of 
the stock market, but appears to be present in more than 70% of it. This suggests several potentially useful 
lines of further research enquiry. First, it would be of interest to develop a model for bubble-contagion 
between sectors, which would explain empirically how bubbles are formed first (and collapse first) in 
certain high growth sectors and then spread to other sectors. Second, from an asset allocation perspective, 
it would be of interest to determine whether approaches based on estimating separate bubble models for 
each sector could be used to time the market. A trading rule so-formed would buy into sectors where a 
bubble was in the early stages of growing and would switch into less bubbly sectors when the probability 
of bubble collapse became unacceptably high. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) suggest that hedge funds 
were able to do this in the context of the recent rise and fall of the technology sector. There is also 
evidence to suggest that sector effects are now at least as important country effects (see Baca et al., 2000). 
Finally, the growth and subsequent collapse of speculative bubbles at the sector or stock level may be used 
to improve the usefulness of standard asset pricing models in explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
returns.  
 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-07 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: S&P 500 GICS Sector Indices Real Values 
January 1976 – January 2001 
Panel A: Index Values 





Staples  Energy  Financials  Health 
Care  Industrials  Information 
Technology  Materials  Telecomm. 
Services  Utilities 
Mean  548.03  545.64  959.67  562.79  1,047.40  809.45  700.39  780.82  346.00  444.06  290.31 
Peak Value  1,597.57  1,827.48  2,958.60  1,234.83  3,860.04  3,150.22  2,014.92  5,525.06  677.94  1,255.31  486.04 
Low Value  202.42  155.72  193.53  258.54  232.75  204.08  247.30  190.54  133.45  180.34  180.32 
ADF Test 




-6.65***  -12.93***  -4.26***  -11.49***  -7.04***  -6.15***  -12.31***  -8.57***  -10.51***  -4.65***  -5.9*** 
Panel B: Logarithmic Returns 
Mean  0.48%  0.49%  0.70%  0.44%  0.83%  0.77%  0.61%  0.75%  0.15%  0.31%  0.14% 
Median  0.39%  0.87%  0.84%  0.68%  1.06%  1.08%  0.80%  0.71%  0.12%  0.49%  0.18% 
Maximum  10.75%  18.17%  17.77%  16.64%  19.78%  12.89%  14.69%  20.32%  25.88%  12.05%  11.23% 
Minimum  -13.51%  -32.14%  -20.63%  -17.93%  -23.46%  -20.54%  -31.02%  -29.07%  -34.31%  -14.92%  -11.36% 
Standard 
Deviation  3.41%  5.37%  4.53%  5.02%  5.73%  4.91%  5.01%  6.60%  5.93%  4.62%  3.91% 
Skewness  -0.46  -0.56  -0.28  -0.15  -0.24  -0.45  -0.69  -0.21  -0.31  -0.18  0.07 
Excess 
Kurtosis  2.23  4.32  2.14  1.09  1.52  0.68  5.02  1.65  4.38  0.30  -0.06 
Jarque-Bera 
Test  278.16***  239.88***  58.54***  15.14***  30.11***  15.36***  326.85***  34.44***  235.1***  2.56  0.30 
Q-Statistic 
(12 lags)  9.76  16.26  17.66  7.58  11.34  10.31  15.02  7.34  10.90  7.60  12.12 
ADF 
Statistic  -6.71***  -9.25***  -5.45***  -11.05***  -11.07***  -6.85***  -11.49***  -10.74***  -12.76***  -12.07***  -6.3*** 
* Denotes rejection of the null at the 90% confidence level, ** Denotes rejection of the null at the 95% confidence level, *** Denotes rejection of the null at the 99% confidence 
level. The S&P 500 Composite Index has been rescaled so that the value in January 1976 is equal to 100. The Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests are performed including an 
intercept and a time trend. 
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Table 2: Results of van Norden and Shaller Bubble Models for S&P 500 Composite Index and Sectors  





Staples  Energy  Financials  Health 





Materials  Telecomm. 
Services  Utilities 
0 , S β   1.0039***  1.0061***  1.0094***  1.009***  1.0082***  1.0075***  1.0059***  1.0106***  1.0064***  1.0097***  1.0055*** 
B S, β   0.045**  0.0078  0.0461**  0.0059  0.0108  0.0198  0.0014  0.0125***  0.0118  0.0323***  -0.0205 
0 , C β   0.9848***  0.9641***  0.9864***  0.9802***  0.9574***  0.9675***  0.9703***  0.9592***  0.9956*  0.9749***  0.9953*** 
B C, β   -0.0396**  -0.0406  -0.04*  -0.0333***  -0.1072**  -0.0301***  -0.0358***  -0.0020  -0.0214  -0.0347***  -0.02972 
0 , q β   2.233**  1.8552**  3.2069**  2.6697***  2.5936**  2.1652***  1.7161**  3.3458**  1.9027*  1.7732***  1.7699*** 
B q, β   -2.3898**  -1.6421**  -9.7083*  -2.2515***  -2.1283**  -2.6174***  -1.9366***  -4.6551***  -0.2785  -2.4319***  -1.8731 
S σ   0.0303***  0.0462***  0.0341***  0.0351***  0.0487***  0.0377***  0.0409***  0.0536***  0.0497***  0.0328***  0.036*** 
C σ   0.0583***  0.1139***  0.0616***  0.0756***  0.0866***  0.1071***  0.0946***  0.102***  0.1444***  0.0854***  0.0781** 
Log-Likelihood  545.4657  463.3945  508.1658  483.6009  441.4014  485.8485  491.5473  404.8112  440.6822  488.9863  551.4246 
AIC  -3.5712  -3.0259  -3.3234  -3.1601  -2.8797  -3.1751  -3.2129  -2.6366  -2.8750  -3.1959  -3.6108 
SC  -3.5585  -3.0132  -3.3106  -3.1474  -2.8670  -3.1624  -3.2002  -2.6239  -2.8622  -3.1832  -3.5981 
HQ  -3.6034  -3.0581  -3.3556  -3.1923  -2.9119  -3.2073  -3.2451  -2.6688  -2.9072****  -3.2281  -3.6430 
0 , 0 , 0 , C S N β β β ≠ ≠   4.6829**  6.5034**  5.9882**  11.0453***  10.766***  10.4752***  14.9101***  8.3446***  1.3479  26.4969***  1.4279 
0 , < B C β   3.509*  1.1362  3.194*  8.0214***  11.3689***  14.1247***  7.3903***  0.0843  1.8266  16.3953***  0.9150 
B C B S , , β β >   3.8702**  1.1790  4.8045**  6.318**  11.4737***  11.7375***  3.547*  6.187**  1.3276  18.3582***  1.7728 
0 , > V S β   4.3467**  8.0021***  14.2625***  21.7741***  9.2756***  24.3092***  11.4976***  7.4522***  1.0819  18.322***  2.1658 
                       
Volatility Regimes  4.3232  14.8093***  55.5717***  23.0831***  16.1476***  13.9962***  15.0771***  29.0848***  5.2787  60.3627***  10.2341** 
Mixture of 
Normals  8.8449**  10.6725**  12.605***  15.9457***  11.8602***  11.2241**  10.6348**  18.7704***  4.7168  42.9344***  5.7420 
Fads  6.1421  7.5195*  8.767**  6.6486*  8.1651**  8.4831**  6.7474*  18.2074***  5.2361  33.3697***  5.1519  
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Table 3: Results of Augmented Bubble Model Including Volume for S&P 500 Composite Index and Sectors  





Staples  Energy  Financials  Health 
Care  Industrials  Information 
Technology  Materials  Telecomm. 
Services  Utilities 
0 , S β   1.0018***  1.0069***  1.0095***  1.0086***  1.0079***  1.0079***  1.0055***  1.0105***  1.0076***  1.0094***  1.0073*** 
B S, β   0.0326***  0.0140  0.0494***  -0.0023  0.0091  0.0091  0.0128  0.0227**  0.0102  0.0327***  -0.0218 
V S, β   0.0046***  0.0079***  0.0518***  0.0548***  0.0129**  0.0129**  0.0229***  0.0799***  0.0005  0.026*  0.0271 
0 , C β   0.9799***  0.9647***  0.9881***  0.9806***  0.9582***  0.9682***  0.9725***  0.9572***  0.9963  0.9757***  0.9962*** 
B C, β   -0.1003**  -0.0367  -0.0568*  -0.0347**  -0.137**  -0.037**  -0.0312*  -0.0060  -0.0274  -0.0397***  -0.0266 
0 , q β   2.4818***  1.9225*  4.5632***  2.7978***  2.6448**  2.3448**  2.1149***  11.1569**  1.9091*  1.8426***  1.9022*** 
B q, β   -2.538***  -1.8711**  -11.3937***  -2.8715***  -2.1909***  -2.9909***  -1.8902**  -14.9375**  -0.2591  -2.2286***  -0.3254 
V q, β   -2.115**  -0.8713**  -7.8133**  -1.2512***  -1.5886*  -1.5886*  -1.5581**  -5.7916**  0.0703  -1.4529***  0.8534 
S σ   0.0337***  0.0435***  0.033***  0.0381***  0.0501***  0.0381***  0.0406***  0.0491***  0.0499***  0.0323***  0.0331*** 
C σ   0.0664***  0.1159***  0.0657***  0.0749***  0.1021***  0.1029***  0.0941***  0.1046***  0.1447***  0.0857***  0.0705*** 
Log-Likelihood  567.0250  479.0130  515.7637  488.0882  452.6235  497.1441  498.2866  430.3478  441.9607  499.4787  552.2597 
AIC  -3.7012  -3.1164  -3.3606  -3.1767  -2.9410  -3.2368  -3.2444  -2.793****  -2.8635  -3.2524  -3.6031 
SC  -3.6853  -3.1005  -3.3447  -3.1608  -2.9251  -3.2209  -3.2285  -2.7771****  -2.8476  -3.2365  -3.5872 
HQ  -3.7414  -3.1566  -3.4008  -3.2169  -2.9813  -3.2771  -3.2847  -2.8333****  -2.9038  -3.2926  -3.6433**** 
0 , 0 , 0 , C S N β β β ≠ ≠   6.2804**  20.0911***  8.0486***  10.3665***  4.8744**  5.7364**  15.2461***  17.2873***  0.8087  18.8617***  1.8117 
0 , < B C β   5.0622**  1.8686  3.6907*  5.0123**  3.7619*  6.4945**  5.6641**  0.6007  1.4529  12.1474***  0.5049 
B C B S , , β β >   8.1711***  1.5656  9.8825***  3.6593*  9.9338***  8.0965***  6.2186**  3.0893*  1.6036  17.1957***  1.6607 
0 , > V S β   36.2693***  5.1441**  11.7277***  7.1777***  20.7745***  8.4128***  9.8212***  56.398***  1.9597  16.8143***  0.8097 
0 , < B q β   47.3068***  4.0649**  14.1563***  10.0679***  6.1407**  4.6832**  10.881***  16.1047***  0.4053  14.3062***  1.7082 
0 , < V q β   9.4485***  5.7098**  9.3882***  12.0002***  3.1888*  5.2682**  11.2564***  13.061***  1.0415  11.0646***  1.6876 
                       
Volatility 
Regimes  47.4418***  46.0463***  70.7676***  32.0579***  38.5919***  36.5874***  28.5557***  80.1579***  5.8357  81.3476***  11.9044* 
Mixture of 
Normals  51.9635***  41.9095***  27.8008***  24.9204***  34.3044***  33.8153***  24.1134***  69.8435***  5.2738  60.3627***  - 
Fads  49.2607***  38.7565***  23.9628***  15.6233***  30.6093***  31.0743***  20.226***  69.2805***  5.7931  54.3547***  6.8222 
Original vNS  43.1186***  31.237***  15.1959***  8.9747**  22.4442***  22.5912***  13.4786***  51.0731***  0.5570  20.9849***  1.6703  
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Figure 1: Real S&P 500 GICS Sector Indices 
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Figure 3: GICS Sectors Percentage of S&P 500 Market Capitalization 
























































Figure 4: S&P 500 Information Technology Price Index, Dividend Index and Dividend Yield 
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Figure 5: S&P 500 Industrials Price Index, Dividend Index and Dividend Yield 































































Figure 6: S&P 500 Materials Price Index, Dividend Index and Dividend Yield 



























































Figure 7: S&P 500 Composite and GICS Sector Dividend Multiple Bubble Deviations 
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